The U.S. Senate homeland security committee has released its report on Benghazi. You can read it here – http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2012/12/30/latest-senate-report-flashing-red-on-benghazi-attack/?intcmp=related
It differs little from the report released earlier by the State Dept. Accountability Review Board (ARB) report. You can read it here – http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf
Both reports conclude the U.S. State Dept. was at fault for failing to respond to mounting security threats. Both reports also conclude that the intelligence community didn’t provide specific “actionable” intelligence prior to the attacks. In contrast, Libyan interim President Mohammed el-Megarif contends his government passed on information regarding a “credible threat” 48 hours prior to the attacks – http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/libya-we-gave-us-threeday-warning-of-benghazi-attack-8145242.html
The Senate report findings include these seemingly contradictory claims. First it lists this finding.
Finding 3. The absence of specific intelligence about an imminent attack should not have prevented the Department of State from taking more effective steps to protect its personnel and facilities in Benghazi.
Then within the same finding it states this based upon a 1985 committee report finding included in the Inman Report.
it would be foolhardy to make security decisions on the basis of an expectation of advance warning of peril
Lets see if we can keep up with their logic to this point. Both reports cite numerous accounts of security incidents and threats in the months leading up to the attacks. Both reports cite no specific or actionable intelligence immediately prior to the attacks. Then the Senate report finds that an absence of that specific intelligence shouldn’t have prevented the implementation of more security. Then immediately thereafter the report states “it would be foolhardy to make security decisions on the basis of an expectation of advance warning of peril”.
Got that? Lots of previous security threats none of which are specific which aren’t required to increase security but would be foolhardy to rely upon to increase security. If that’s not a clear example of clear as mud, I don’t know what is. That’s your taxpayer dollars at work for you folks.
The Senate report goes on in finding 4 to cite the responsibility of the host nation to protect “consular” (key word) facilities and quotes the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Yet, both reports highlight that this was no diplomatic facility. It was a U.S. special mission, or mission, and an annex used by another government agency (read CIA). Why should the host country be required to protect a non-diplomatic facility? Of course when you’re conducting a covert, multi-agency operation in overseas facilities, you shouldn’t expect highly visible host country security, should you? No, that’s why you employ contract security such as the “February 17 Brigade, a Libyan militia deputized by the Libyan government but not under its direct control” as the report stated previously.
The report goes on to detail the reasons why the February 17 Brigade was utilized and the concerns surrounding their abilities throughout 2012. This is where reports such as this are less than useless. The attempt is made to show a pattern of security concerns and the lack of action taken in response to said concerns to mitigate the blame for the administration taking action once the attacks commenced. The reports can’t address the nature of these non-diplomatic missions because it’s classified. Security wasn’t increased because it would draw attention where none was wanted. So blaming the State Dept. or the host country is like blaming the dog for eating your homework after you used it to wrap your leftover steak.
The rest of the report is merely protocol reviews and recommendations for reviewing security at other locations globally. Again, a waste of time and your taxpayer dollars because none of that applies to covert ops as this was.
It does address the botched media narrative of not labeling a terrorist attack as such in finding 9 claiming the administration was “inconsistent”. Really? There was nothing inconsistent whatsoever. The administration was nothing but consistent in distributing its talking points to ensure this event was not labeled a terrorist action. It was only after the video cover-up story imploded and third-party accounts finally pressured administration officials to abandon the non-terrorist labeling.
Here is part of the conclusion.
Conclusion The deaths of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans at the hands of terrorists is a tragic reminder that the fight our country is engaged in with Islamist extremists and terrorists is not over. U.S. and Western diplomats, and other personnel operating in the Middle East and other countries where these terrorists use violence to further their extremist agenda and thwart democratic reforms are increasingly at risk.
How many ways can I say “bullshit”? When you engage in arms trafficking to Al-Qaeda as well as regime destabilization as in Syria, you’re playing a dangerous game. The tragedy of the deaths of 4 Americans needlessly is blood on the hands of this administration pure and simple.